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COMMENT

HIV/AIDS AND THE PRE-EXISTING HEALTH
CONDITION STANDARD: TEACHING AN
OLD DOG NEW TRICKS'
The availability of medical and life insurance for persons with
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune
Defimency Syndrome (AIDS) has severely decreased m recent

years. 2 This decline m coverage is due, in part, to the msurancb
industry's long established practice of using pre-existing health conditions against an applicant. 3 Recently, m Lilley v. Protective Life
Ins. Co.,4 an AIDS patient challenged this practice after his insurance company refused him coverage. 5 Ignoring society's desperate
1. "The AIDS epidemic occurred at a time when a number of other social
forces had begun to call into question the way in which our society provides
health care through a private insurance system." CLOSEN, AIDS: CASES AND
MATERALs 533 (1989).

2. This decrease in the availability of insurance coverage is due, in part, to
the insurance industry's use of HIV testing as a means to screen applicants.
Schatz, The AIDS InsuranceCrzs: Underwritingor Overreaching?,100 HARv.
L. REv. 1782, 1786 (1987) [hereinafter Schatz, Underwriting]. See also American Council of Life Ins. v. District of Columbia, 645 F Supp. 84, 85 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Closen, Connor, Kaufman, and Wojcik, AIDS: Testing Democracy-Irrational Responses to the Public Health Crwts and the Need for Prvacy rn Serologc Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L.REv. 835, 915-16 (1986) [hereinafter Closen,
Testing Democracy]; Note, AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Underwriting:A ParadigmaticInquiry, 49 OHIo ST.L. J. 1059, 1059 (1989) [hereinafter Note, A ParadigmaticInquzry].
3. A pre-existing health condition is a condition or illness originating prior
to the issuance of an insurance policy. Annotation, Constructionand Application of Provs
in Health orHospitalizationPolicy Excluding or Postponing
Coverageof An illness OriginatingPriorto Issuance of Policy or Within Stated
Time, 94 A.L.R. 3d 990, 994-98 (1979) [hereinafter Annotation, Construction].
The insurance industry uses this condition to limit its coverage and liability by
including clauses in its policies that preclude coverage for an illness suffered by
an applicant prior to the drafting of the policy. Id. For a further discussion of
the history of the insurance industry's use of the pre-existing health condition
standard see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
4. Lilley v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1989) (unpublished, opinion reported at No. 89-3114 LXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) [heretoafter Lilley Il].
5. Lilley v. Protective Life Ins. Co., No. 87-5706 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 1989)
(Ixs,
Genfed library, Dist. file) (unpublished opinion), rev'd, 884 F.2d 575
[hereinafter Lilley 1]. The plaintiff, Milton Lilley, challenged Protective Life
Insurance (Protective) Company's denial of proceeds on a credit life insurance
policy issued on the lives of Lilley and his lover, Tommy Ray Wells. Id. at 1.
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plea for a solution to this growing problem, 6 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals failed to issue an opinion after it ruled in favor of the
insurance company.1 Thus, a court that could have clarified the insurance industry's controversial s use of pre-existing health conditions, a practice especially damaging to persons with AIDS, merely
skirted the issue at hand.9
Upon the death of Lilley, Wells, or both, Protective was obligated to pay Dryades Savings and Loan Association the balance of a $54,812.70 mortgage taken
out by Lilley and Wells. Id. at 1-2. The credit life insurance policy application
did not require a physical examination, but it did require Lilley and Wells to
answer a general health questionnaire. Id. at 2. Protective claimed that Lilley
and Wells misrepresented their health conditions on this questionnaire because
they answered "no" to the following two questions:
[1]. Do you know of any impairment in your health or physical condition?
[2]. Have you consulted or been treated by a physician or other practitioner for any illness, or been confined in a hospital during the last five
years?
["Illness" was defined as] "some type of illness or disease that could unpair
longevity."
I& at 2-5.
Wells had tested positive for HIV exposure in September of 1985, the same
month he and Lilley applied for the credit life insurance policy. However,
Wells was never hospitalized for any symptoms of AIDS. Id. at 3-4. In addition,
doctors diagnosed Wells as having hepatitis B when he attempted to donate
blood. Id. at 3. However, Wells' doctor told hun that the hepatitis was not
chromc, and apparently, Wells did not believe it to be a serious condition. Id. at
6. Lilley, on the other hand, was suffering from the early stages of AIDS [classified as ARC ("AIDS Related Complex")] when he answered the above questions. Wells died in April of 1987 from chromc hepatitis and peritonitis. Lilley
II, supra note 4, at 4. Prior to his death, Wells did not suffer from any of the
early symptoms of AIDS, appearing to be totally asymptomatic. Lilley I, supra,
at 7-9. However, Protective and the court, in Lilley II, postulated that an HIV
positive applicant, although asymptomatic, had an illness within the meaning of
question 2. Therefore, both Wells, who did not believe himself "ill", and Lilley
could be denied coverage. Lilley II, supra note 4, at 8. Lilley clearly misrepresented himself on the application since he had been hospitalized and treated for
AIDS prior to his insurance application. Wells, on the other hand, had never
been "treated by a physician or other practitioner" for HIV/AIDS nor had he
been hospitalized during the five years prior to his application. Lilley I, supra,
at 5-10.
6. AIDS may affect as many as 270,000 Americans by 1991 See Merritt,
Communicable Disease and ConstitutionalLaw: ControllingAIDS, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 739, 739 (1986); Note, A ParadigmaticInquzry, supra note 2, at 1059.
7. Lilley II, supra note 4, at 1.
8. The insurance industry's use of the pre-existing health condition standard in the wake of the AIDS crisis has been labeled "controversial" due to its
ability to totally preclude coverage for an entire sector of the population. See
Schatz, Underwriting,supra note 2, at 1782. Although the industry has used
this practice in dealing with other diseases and conditions, its use in light of the
generalized symptoms of AIDS is causing quite an uproar. See Closen, Testing
Democracy, supra note 2, at 844-45, 915-16. But see Clifford & Iuculano, AIDS
and Insurance: The Rationale for ADS-Related Testing, 100 HARv. L. REv.
1806, 1807 (1987) [hereinafter Clifford, Aids and Insurance] (insurance industry
must be allowed to continue using HIV testing in determining insurability to
preserve the present unbiased pricing system).
9. The court, in Lilley II, stated:
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An insurance company can only escape its liability on the basis
of a pre-existing condition if it can prove that the insured intended
to '"wilfully nisrepresent" himself at the time of application.10 In
many of these "wilful misrepresentation" cases, the insurance company provided coverage without requiring the applicant to undergo
a thorough physical examination." However,,theinsurance compa2
nies often requested that the applicant complete a general form,'
which included questions concerning the applicant's past medical
history, as a prerequisite to coverage. These general forms contained ambiguous language and broad questions, and courts have refused to construe the ambiguities against the applicant. 13 However,
Local Rule 47.5 provides: 'The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely demde particular cases on the basis of well-settled
prnciples of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession.' Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published.
Lilley I, supra note 4, at 1. However, this case does have precedential value
because the public may view the outcome of the case as an affirmation of the
insurance industry's preclusionary practices.
10. Compare Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Waite, 551 So. 2d 1003 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1989) (agent's wilful misrepresentation does not deny coverage to insured)
and Taylor v. Security Indus. Ins. Co., 452 So. 2d 1260 (La. CL App. 1984) (later
evidence that insured was diabetic and alcoholic not specific proof that these
conditions were present at time of application) and Pete 'Roy Ford, Inc. v.
Lackney, 390 So. 2d 248 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (insured did not knowingly misrepresent heart disease at time of application) with Lentz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
428 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1970) (insured's failure to report two year treatment for
diabetes was a wilful misrepresentation) and Useldinger v. Old Republic Life
Ins. Co., 377 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (failure to disclose history of treatment for high blood pressure, alcohol abuse, and liver-related problems was wilful misrepresentation) and Veal v. Veteran's Life Ins. Co., 767 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1989) (policy void due to failure of insured to disclose treatment for
high blood pressure and drunk driving record).
11. See Johnson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 368 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1979)
(insurance company told applicant no examination was necessary); Key v. Cherokee Credit Life Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 892 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (no mqury made
into applicant's health).
12. The questions on these forms are similar to those on Lilley's questionnaire. See supra note 5 for an example of the questions contained on health
insurance forms. See, eg., Bertrand v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 419 So. 2d 1254
(La. Ct. App. 1982) (noting questions used on applicant's insurance form);
Brown v. National Old Life Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 1023 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (noting
questions used by insurance company).
13. As long as applicants do not materially misrepresent themselves on
their application, courts have usually upheld ambiguities in the insurance contracts against their insurer. See, e.g., Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283
(11th Cir. 1990) (applicant's reliance on agent's interpretation of ambiguous policy language upheld against insurance company); Baker v. Washington Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1987) (pregnancy coverage cannot be demed
due to ambiguity of policy conversion language); Bertrand v. Protective Life
Ins. Co., 419 So.2d 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (obesity not considered a "physical
impairment" or "illness," and voluntary hospitalization of alcoholism not "confinement" within meaning of policy); Goodson v. American Home Assur. Co.,
251 F Supp. 125 (E.D. Tenn. 1966) (plane crash victim could recover since policy
language regarding the term "operated by" was ambiguous); Hulse v. Blue
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courts have recognized the insurance industry's right to request a
physical examination for a potential insured. 14 The insurance industry may then use the results of this examination to preclude coverage.' 5 It is within these two seemingly contradictory judicial
determinations that an HIV/AIDS patient must try to find a solution to his growing need for insurance benefits and within which
the insurance industry must structure its practices.
This comment addresses the inapplicability of the pre-existing
health condition standard to the current AIDS crisis. It begins with
a brief overview of the medical background of HIV/AIDS. Next, it
examines the history behind the pre-existing health condition standard and probes this standard's inapplicability in managing the generalized symptoms and medical problems of AIDS. Finally, this
comment proposes a cost spreading analysis which the insurance industry should use to prevent the total exclusion of insurance coverage for HIV/AIDS applicants.

I. AIDS: AN OVERVIEW
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, AIDS, is a virus
which attacks the human immune system 16 rendering it incapable
of preventing the onslaught of opportunistic diseases. 17 Thus, the
Cross/Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 424 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (coverage given to surgical removal of tumor due to ambiguous terms in policy).
14. Courts have upheld the insurance industry's right to require a physical
examination on several occasions, and this practice is now standard throughout
the industry. See Wright v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 254 F Supp. 1018,1024 (D.C. Va.
1966) (examination by company physician condition precedent to acceptability);
Anderson v. Continental Assur. Co., 666 P.2d 245, 248 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (insured died before examination could be performed). Courts have also recognized the right of the insurance industry to require HIV tests as a precursor to
coverage. See American Council of Life Ins. v. District of Columbia, 645 F
Supp. 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Life Ins. Ass'n of Mass. v. Commissioner of Ins.,
403 Mass. 410, 413-17, 530 N.E.2d 168, 170-72 (1988).
15. The insurance industry has used HIV tests, with judicial approval,

against prospective insurance applicants. See American Council of Life Ins. v.
District of Columbia, 645 F. Supp. 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (District of Columbia
ordinance excluding coverage for AIDS applicants upheld); Life Ins. Ass'n of
Mass. v. Commissioner of Ins., 403 Mass. 410, 413-17, 530 N.E.2d 168, 170-72
(1988) (commissioner's attempt to regulate insurance industry's use of exclusionary HIV testing demed).
16. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMU-

NODEFICiENCY ViRus EPDEMIC 1-3 (1988) [hereinafter PREsiDENTiAL CoMMIsSION REPORT] (background on spread of AIDS in the United States). See also
Stability and Inactivation of HTLV-III/LAV Under Clincal and Laboratory
Environments, 25 J. A.M.A. 1887-91 (1986) (brief discussion of the mode of
transmission of HIV and risks involved); Closen, Testing Democracy, supra
note 2, at 856-61 (discussion of the transm,ssion of HIV and how it causes
disease).
17. Doctors label diseases "opportunistic" because they occur more quickly
and commonly in patients who have depressed immune systems. MERCK SHARP
AND

DOHME

RESEARCH LABORATORIES, THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS

1991]

AIDS and the Pre-Exsting Health Condition Standard

657

body of a person afflicted with AIDS cannot battle pneumonia, oral
or esophageal disorders,'8 or even the common head cold.1 9 This
person's body lacks the "armor" to fight the vruses20 and illnesses
of everyday life.

HIV, or the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, causes

AIDS.21

The viral genes of HIV integrate with the patient'g'enes, transforming a normal cell into an abnormal cell. 22 Due to this transformation, the abnormal cell is incapable of performing its proper

germ fighting function.23 Principally, HIV attacks the white blood
cells which produce antibodies necessary to destroy foreign matter
m the human body.2 Blood tests25 can detect the presernce of these
AND TfERAPY 57-58 (R.. Berkow, M.D. 14th ed. 1982)

[hereinafter THE

MERCK

MANUAL].

18. One of the earliest reports of AIDS identified oral, and esophageal
candidiasis as a symptom of the virus. Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonuz--LosAngeles, 30 MoRBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 25052 (1981). Candidiasis is an "infection with a fungus of the germ candida. It is
usually a superficial infection of the moist cutaneous area of the body.
most
commonly involves the skin, oral mucous membranes, respiratory tract, and vagina." THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL'DICTIONARY'109
(1987) [hereinafter SLOANE-DORLAND DICTIONARY]. See also PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 1-2, 7-11.
19. PREsIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 8-9. See also
Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 856-61.
20. A virus is "one of a group of minute infectious agents ... characterized
by a lack of independent metabolism and the ability to replicate only within
living host cells. Like living organisms, they are able to reproduce with genetic
continuity and the possibility of mutation." SLOANE-DORLAND DICTIONARY,
supranote 18, at 776. Viruses are the cause of many diseases in human beings
and include: chicken pox, polio, hepatitis, and the common cold. Closen, Testsng Democracy, supra note 2, at 859.
21. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISsION REPORT, supra note 16, at 7. See also Centers for Disease Control, ClassiicationSystem for Human T-Lymphotrapic Virus Type IIILymphadenopathy-AssociatedVirus Infections, 35 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALrrY WEEKLY REP 334-39 (1986) (persons with AIDS appear to be first
infected with HTLV-MI/LAV [an early classification of HIV]).
22. PREsIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 37-49. See also
CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 111.
23. CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 37-49.
24. Id.
25. Doctors and scientists use two blood tests to detect the presence of HIV
in the human body. The first is the enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay or
ELISA test. The ELISA test involves mixing a patient's blood serum with viral
antigens. Centers for Disease Control, Update: Serologc Testing for Antibody
to Human Immunodqcency Virus, 36 MORBIDITY AND MORTALTY WEEKLY
REP 833-40 (1988). See also Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 872-75.
An antigen is "any substance which is capable, under appropriate conditions, of
inducing a specific immune response and of reacting with the products of that

response." SLOANE-DORLAND DICTIONARY, supranote 18, at 42. After this antigen reaction takes place, the specimen is mixed with a solution containing

human antibodies which attach to the antiviral antibodies in the specimen.
Centers for Disease Control, Update: Serologic Testing for Antibody to Human
Immunodejicency Virus, 36 MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 833-40
(1988); Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 872 n.158. A color change
shows the presence of HIV antibodies in the serum sample. The current accu-
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abnormal antibodies 26 and determine if an individual is infected
with HIV.
Transmission of HIV requires: (1) exposure to HIV; (2) entry of

the virus into the host; and (3) successful replication within the
host.27 After a person has been exposed to HIV, the virus enters his
system and duplicates itself within that person's previously healthy
cells.28 Thus, HIV "breeds" new and abnormal cells that resemble
the original normal host cells.2 9 Scientists have found HIV in
blood, semen, saliva, urine and other bodily fluids. 8 To date, the
only known methods to transmit HIV are through blood and blood
products, needle-sharing, and intimate sexual contact.3 ' However,
under current testing procedures, time must elapse between when a
racy of the ELISA test ranges from 60% to 97%. Closen, Testing Democracy,
supra note 2, at 873.
The second test doctors and scientists use to detect the presence of HIV
antibodies is the Western Blot test. This test separates the antiviral antibodies
in the serum sample so that antibodies specific to ETV antigens are detected. Id.
at 836-37. The Western Blot test is able to detect specific antiviral component
antibodies of HIV and, therefore, has a higher accuracy rate. IM 'It is thought
to be nearly 100% accurate." Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 873.
See also Centers for Disease Control, Update: PublicHealth Sermce Workshop
on Human T-Lymphotropzc Virus Type IIIAntibody Testing-UnitedStates, 34
MoRBimrry AND MORTAL=r WEEKLY REP. 477, 477-78 (1985).
The ELISA test is less expensive to administer than the Western Blot and
is, therefore, usually the first test used to screen blood. Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 872. Several licensed ELISA test kits are currently available on the market. This availability has lead to a wide variance in
sensitivity/accuracy of positive results. Id. If an ELISA test is positive, the test
is repeated and followed by a Western Blot test for confirmation. Id. at 873.
The Western Blot test is more sophisticated and more expensive than the
ELISA test and, therefore, is not used for mass screening of applicants. Id. at
873. However, the Western Blot is a more reliable test due to its high level of
sensitivity. Id. at 873. But see Saag & Britz, Asymptomatic Blood Donor With A
False PositiveHTLV-Ill Western Blot, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 118 (1986) (report
casting doubt upon accuracy of Western Blot tests as an indicator of true HIV
status).
26. An antibody is "an immunoglobulin molecule that has a specific amino
acid sequence by virtue of which it interacts only with the antigen that induced
its synthesis in cells of the lymphoid series, or with antigen closely related to
it." SLOANE-DORLAND DIcnoNARY, supra note 18, at 41. An antibody is a molecule with a specific and identifiable structure which will only interact with the
antigen responsible for its creation. For a definition of an antigen, see supra
note 25.
27. Stability and Inactivation of HTL V-Il/LAV Under Clinwal and LaboratoryEnnronments,25 J. A.M.A. 1887-91 (1986). See also Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 856-61; CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 113.
28. See Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 857-59; CLOSEN, supra
note 1, at 113.
29. See Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 858-59.
30. Centers for Disease Control, Testing Donors of Organs, Tissues and
Semen for Antibody to Human T-Lymphotroptc Virus Type ILI/Lymphadenopathy-Assoczated Virus, 31 MoRBIDIY AND MoRTALrrY WEEKLY REP. 294
(1985). See also Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 864-66.
31. See supra note 26 for the function of an antibody.
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person actually contracts HIV and when HIV antibodies can be detected.3 2 Thins time period between infection and detection is often
referred to as the "window period".s3
Early warning signs of AIDS usually consist of high fevers,
night sweats and rapid weight loss.m Later stages of tins disease
include pneumocystis pneumonias and kaposi's sarcoma,sa a rare
disease which causes nodules to form under the skin and organs.
Eventually, an individual with AIDS can no longer fight the constant diseases attacking his body, and dies. There is no known cure
or nimmunization for HIV/AIDS. 37 The few government approved
drugssa for treatment of HIV/AIDS only slow the dying process;
32. Closen, supra note 1, at 131. See also A Time of Mild Optimism on
Treatmentfor AIDS, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, vol. 321, no. 175 (Jun. 24,
1990).
33. CLOsEN, supranote 1, at 131. See also Closen, TestingDemocracy,supra
note 2, at 861.
34. Centers for Disease Control, Update on Acquired Immune D*Fi
Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 MORBIDTY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY

REP.507-14 (1982) (basic case definition of AIDS and description of the combination of symptoms necessary for diagnosis). See also PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 7-16 (overview on AIDS patient care).
35. Pneumocystis pneumonia, also known as pneumocystis cartii, is a parasite that causes infection in persons with weakened immune systems. See Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30
MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 250, 250-52 (1981); THE MERCK MANUAL, supra note 17, at 664.
36. A sarcoma is "a tumor made up of a substance like the embryonic connective tissue ...composed of closely packed cells embedded in a fibrillar substance . often highly malignant." SLOANE-DORLAND DICTIoNARY, supra note
18, at 625. Kaposi's sarcoma is a rare cancer that causes malignant tumors -of
blood vessel cells to occur under the skin and in the lymph nodes and other
body parts. See Centers for Disease Control, Kaposi'sSarcomaand Pneumocystis Pneumonza Among Homosexual Men-New York City and CaIfornza, 30
MoRBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.305, 305-08 (1981).

37. Almost since the start of the AIDS epidemic, scientists have been attempting to find a cure or vaccine for the AIDS virus. See CLOSEN, supranote
1, at 145-48 (general discussion of the function of a vaccine and the efforts to
develop one for AIDS).
38. The only drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration for fighting AIDS is Aidothymidine (AZT). AZT or Retrovir, is used to manage the
spread of AIDS symptoms in patients with symptomatic HIV infection. PHYSICLANS' DESK REFERENCE 793 (E. Barnhart 43d ed. 1989). See also PRESmENTIAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 9. This drug is primarily recommended

for patients with a history of pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, candidiasis,
and/or a loss of ten percent or more body weight. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra,at 794. Although AZT can slow the onslaught of opportunistic diseases, it is not a cure for HIV infection. Nor has it been shown to reduce the
risk of HIV transmission to others through sexual contact or blood transfusion.
Id. at 794. Additionally, AZT is known to have serious side effects that preclude
many AIDS patients from taking the drug. Included among the known side
effects are: (1) anemia; (2) severe headaches; (3) nausea; (4) msomma; and (5)
seizures. Id. at 794-95. Several other drugs, reported to have similar properties
to AZT, have been imported into the United States illegally. Dideoxydenosme
(DDA) and Ribavirus (Virazole) are two of the more frequently "imported"
drugs used by AIDS patients. CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 145. The FDA, as yet,
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they do not prevent it. Insurance coverage during the progression
of HIV/AIDS is necessary to provide an HIV/AIDS patient with
desperately needed medical care in the face of skyrocketing medical
costs.
II.

THE HISTORY BEHIND THE PRE-EXISTING HEALTH

CONDITION STANDARD
Most insurance companies will not insure an applicant's preexisting health conditions. A pre-existing health condition is an illness that originated prior to an insured's application for an insurance policy.3 9 The simplest example of a pre-existing health
condition is the case of an individual who is taking medication to
control high blood pressure.4 0 If such an applicant applied for insurance, his policy would deny coverage for any prior or subsequent
claims that arose from the treatment of high blood pressure, because it existed' prior to the issuance of his policy. On the other
hand, the insurance company can withhold coverage for an insured's pre-existing health condition for a specific time, during
which the policy is effective.42 Therefore, the applicant with high
blood pressure may not be given coverage on claims involving high
blood pressure during the first six months or more of his policy. 43
Or, the insurance company can refuse coverage if a condition
manifests itself after the date of application but prior to the policy's
has not approved any of these "imported" illegal drugs. Therefore, information
on their potency and side effects is unknown. See PRESIDENTIAL CoMMISSIoN
REPORT, supra note 16, at 9-10; CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 145.
39. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the
pre-existing health condition standard.
40. High blood pressure is classified as a pre-existing health condition because it permanently impairs the health of the recipient. It can never be totally
cured; it can only be treated. THE MERCK MANUAL, supra note 17, at 389-99.
See also Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 995-96.
41. There are three judimally accepted definitions to determine the existence or manifestation of a disease; see %nfraI, B, The Pre-EzistingHealth Condition Standard and the "Origzn"of AIDS.
42. Many policies include language (either direct or indirect) that prevent

the coverage of a pre-existing condition during any period when the insurance
policy is effective. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW §§ 17:1-2 (1972).

See also Annotation, Construction,supranote 3, at 994. Many of the symptoms
of this pre-existing condition that may appear after the issuance of the policy
are not covered even though this particular symptom was not known to the
insured at the time of the application for insurance. See generally Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co. v. Milton, 242 Ark. 124, 412 S.W.2d 291 (1967); Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Walley, 251 Miss. 780, 171 So. 2d 358 (1965).
43. The rationale behind this type of limited exclusion of post-application
conditions seems to be that if the applicant survives without an attack for the
first six months to a year, then the applicant is less of a risk. If the applicant's
condition persists, the policy has a clause that classifies the illness as a preexisting condition and the condition is totally excluded from coverage for the
length of the policy. See also MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW

§§ 6:11-12 (1972).
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effective date.44 Therefore, the applicant in the example above
would be denied coverage for his highblood pressure if the need for

medication-arose after he applied for coverage but before the coverage became effective. The insurance company would also deny any
claims filed by this applicant, as a result of his high blood pressure,
during the life of his policy.
The insurance industry's first difficulty in applying the pre-existing health condition standard to HIV/AIDS infected individuals
stems from the standard's definition. The definition of a pre-existing health condition centers on the word "origin".4 5 Many courts
have held that the origin of a disease occurs when it becomes "manifest or active, or when there is a distinct symptom or condition

from which one learned in medicine can, with reasonable accuracy,
46
However, the question of when a disease
diagnose the illness."
manifests itself or becomes active is one of degree. Some jurisdic-

tions hold that a pre-existing condition does not manifest itself if
the condition does not hinder the normal function of the applicant's
body prior to his application for insurance. 4 7 Other jurisdictions
base a condition's manifestation or existence upon the insured's ac-

tual knowledge of the condition. 48 Under this theory, if the insured
44. Many insurance policies have an exclusionary period built into their
terms. If an illness manifests itself between the time the insured makes the
application and the policy's coverage becomes effective, the illness is classified
as a pre-existing condition. Therefore, the insurance industry totally precludes
coverage even though the condition was not known to the applicant until after
he applied for insurance. See MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW
§§ 17:3-5 (1972). See also Cardamone v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 435, 43739, 364 N.E.2d 460, 462-64 (1977) (gall bladder illness excluded since it mamfested itself within thirty day exclusion period); American Life Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 51 So.2d 227, 228 (Miss. 1951) (appendix abscess originating within ninety
day exclusion period excluded); Inman v. Life Ins. Co., 223 S.C. 98, 99, 74 S.E.2d
423, 424 (1953) (ulcer excluded from coverage since it manifested itself within
ninety day exclusion period).
45. Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 995.
46. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAw § 17:4 (1972). See generally
Craig v. Central Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 16 Ill. App. 2d 344, 148 N.E.2d 31 (1958);
Thompson v. Commercial Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d 135 (Miss. 1977); Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 998.
47. See generally Nat'l Casualty Co. v. Hudson, 32 Ala. App. 69,,21 So. 2d
568 (1945) (knee injury did not unpair limb's function until after policy date);
Medical Serv. of D.C. v. Llewellyn, 208 A.2d 734 (D.C. App. 1965) (gall stones
hindered normal function of gall bladder prior to issuance of policy); Miller v.
Industrial Hosp. Ass'n, 183 Neb. 704, 163 N.W.2d 891 (1969) (back condition did
not become chronic until after first six months of policy had elapsed); Reserve
Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (back condition required corrective surgery after issuance of policy).
48. Once an insured is aware, due to a doctor's diagnosis, of his/her condition, the condition is said to have manifested itself. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE LAw §§ 17:6-8 (1972). But see Lovett v. American Family Life Ins.
Co., 107 Ga. App. 603, 131 S.E.2d 70 (1963) (tubal pregnancy held to exist before
there was an outward sign to the applicant). If courts generally accept this definition of a disease, all HIV/AIDS applicants could be precluded from coverage
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was unaware of the condition's presence at the time of his application, then the condition cannot be classified as pre-existing. 49 Since
the symptoms of AIDS can lie dormant for an undetermined period
of years, these definitions of "origin" are difficult to apply to an applicant with HIV/AIDS. 5° Furthermore, the specific origin and
manifestation of the HIV/AIDS are unknown and undetectable.
A second difficulty inherent in the use of the pre-existing
health condition standard is its application to concurrent and independent illnesses. A concurrent illness occurs simultaneously
with the pre-existing condition and may aggravate the pre-existing
condition or be aggravated by it. 51 Conversely, an independent illness is a disease or condition occurring separate and apart from the
pre-existing condition.52 Generally, courts have recognized that
most serious illnesses are accompanied or preceded by other disorders and physical difficulties.Ps Most jurisdictions hold that insurance compames may not deny coverage for independent and/or
because their immune systems from the time of exposure are not "normal". See
also Lincoln Income Life Ins. Co. v. Milton, 242 Ark. 124, 412 S.W.2d 291 (1967)
(cause of cessation of menstrual cycle diagnosed after beginning of policy held

to be a pre-existing condition).
49. See Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc. v. Klapper, 153 Ind. App. 555, 288 N.E.2d 279
(1972) (medical inception of disease is trap for blissfully unaware insurance applicant); Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. May, 87 So. 2d 264 (Miss. 1956) (policy provi-

sion effective from date disease known to patient).
50. A person who is HIV positive is said to be seropositive because the serum in his blood has begun to produce the abnormal HIV antibodies. See supra
note 25 for a discussion of the available HIV tests and seropositivity. Prior to
this conversion, the person has been exposed to HIV but, due to the small

amount of antibodies present in his or her body, the blood tests cannot detect
the presence of HIV For a discussion of this "window period," see supra notes

32-33 and accompanying text.
51. Concurrent illnesses occur at the same time as the pre-existing health
condition. A concurrent illness may aggravate a pre-existing condition such as
the case where liver and gall bladder trouble strained the insured's pre-existing
weak heart condition. Am. Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Smith, 380 S.W.2d 36,
37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Additionally, a concurrent illness can be aggravated
by a pre-existing condition. See Cohen v. N. Am. Life and Casualty Co., 150
Minn. 507, 185 N.W. 939 (1921) (insured allowed to recover even though postoperative adhesions aggravated by adhesions from previous appendicitis
surgery).
52. An independent illness is an illness or condition occurring separate and
apart from the pre-existing health condition. Annotation, Construction,supra
note 3, at 1004-05. The pre-existing condition cannot appear to be the cause of
the independent illness or the claim will be barred. Id. See, e.g., Rogers v. Columbian Protective Ass'n, 132 Conn. 129,129-30, 43 A.2d 72, 73-74 (1945) (hospitalization of insured due to intestinal obstruction not pre-existing generative
organ disorder); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Life, 288 P.2d 717, 719-20 (Okla. 1955)
(myocardial infarction not shown to be result of pre-existing general
arteriosclerosis).
53. See AnL Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Smith, 380 S.W.2d 36,40 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1964) (pre-existing heart condition did not preclude recovery for gall bladder claim); Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 1002-03 (lists cases generally dealing with concurrent illnesses).
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concurrent ailments which complicate a pre-existing health
condition.54
Some jurisdictions allow recovery where the pre-existing condition does not appear to be responsible for the ailment upon which
recovery is sought.sa Additionally, some jurisdictions allow recovery when the pre-existing health condition is not the primary cause

for the insured's further treatment.s6 In each of these situations,
doctors can easily define and trace the concurrent or independent
cause of treatment to an ailment separate from the pre-existing
54. Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 1002-06. For example, coverage could not be denied to a man who died from coronary occlusion after his gall
bladder and liver (independent illnesses) aggravated his pre-existing heart condition. An. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Smith, 380 S.W.2d 36,40 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964). A coronary occlusion is a "complete obstruction of an artery of the heart,
usually from progressive arteriosclerosis." SLOANE-DORLAND DICTIONARY,
supra note 18, at 506.
Mr. Smith was admitted to the hospital because of liver and gall bladder
trouble. Smith, 380 S.W.2d at 38-39. These two conditions aggravated his preexisting heart condition (for which he was not insured) and he subsequently
died of heart failure. Id. at 39. American Life attempted to deny coverage
under his hospitalization policy. Id. The court held that since Smith's gall bladder and liver were the cause of his hospitalization, coverage could not be denied.
Id. at 39-40.
55. Annotation, Construction, supra note 3, at 1002-04. A situation where
the pre-existing condition is not responsible for the illness upon which the
claim is based is similar to the cases dealing with independent illnesses. However, the insured's claim is for a pre-existing illness that the policy did not exclude. Typically, these other pre-existing illnesses occur during the early
exclusion period included in most policies. See supra notes 42-44 for a discussion of the exclusionary period in an insurance policy.
Royal Family Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 42 Ala. App. 48, 168 So. 2d 262 (1964),
provides an illustrative example of this type of situation. In Grimes, the applicant sought recovery for face cancer on a policy that excluded coverage for her
pre-existing leukoplakia of the face. Grmes, 168 So. 2d at 263-64. Leukoplakia,
a form of leukemia which affects the face, is "a progressive malignant disease of
the blood forming organs, characterized by distorted proliferation and development of [corpuscles] in the blood and bone marrow." SLOANE-DORLAND DicTIONARY, supra note 18, at 409-10 (defimng leukemia). The court allowed
recovery since the plaintiff's leukoplakia did not appear to be responsible for
her subsequent face cancer. Grmes, 168 So. 2d at 264.
56. Annotation, Construction,supranote 3, at 1005-06. Three elements are
necessary for a pre-existing condition to be considered the non-primary cause of
surgery: "(1) several conditions are corrected at the same time; (2) one of the
illnesses originated after the exemption period and during the life of the policy,
and (3) the operation was primarily to correct the condition covered or the preexisting condition did not add materially to the bill." Id. at 1005. See also
MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW § 17:11 (1972).
For example, in Neck v. Reliance Indus. Life Ins., 159 So. 449 (La. Ct. App.

1935), a woman operated on for appendicitis and for pre-existing womb lacerations could not be denied coverage for both claims since the appendicitis was the
primary cause for the surgery. Neck, 159 So. at 452. See also Graham v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 267 S.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (pre-existing
varicose veins removed incidentally to prostate condition); Group Hosp. Serv.
Inc. v. Bass, 252 S.W.2d 507, 509-10 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (coverage allowed for
operation on both feet even though only one foot covered by policy since cost
was about the same if operation performed on beth feet)..

The John Marshall Law Reutew

[Vol. 24:653

health condition. This delineated separation is not possible with an
HIV/AIDS patient.57 The difficulty in determining the origin and
effect of a pre-existing health condition in an AIDS patient renders
this standard inapplicable.

IE.

THE PRE-EXISTING HEALTH CONDITION STANDARD AND ITS
INAPPLicABILrrY DURING THE AIDS CIsIs
A.

Risk Classfwation

The pre-existmg health condition standard is inapplicable to
the insurance industry's reliance on risk classification in determinIng the type of coverage an insurance company will offer prospective applicants.-s Risk classification is the practice of placing
applicants in pre-determined categories based upon their life expectancy, age, health, and lifestyle.59 An insurer relies on the projected insurance needs of each group in determining- the amount
and type of coverage to provide an applicant.60 For example, an insurer places an applicant twenty years old, in good health and living
a modest lifestyle in a lower risk category than an older or less
healthy applicant, because the younger applicant's health and life
insurance needs should be minimal.6 1 Thus, the insurer will give
the applicant coverage at a reasonable premium on the theory that
the insurance company will seldom need to pay the applicant's expenses. 62 As this applicant ages or becomes infirm however, his insurance coverage will change correspondingly. 63
Any type of pre-existing health condition also influences the
risk category within which a person is placed.64 Generally, the in-

surer will exclude coverage for the individual's pre-existing condition and simultaneously use the condition to determine the
57. AIDS is a "system" disease. It attacks the human immune system, not
just one particular organ or part. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra

note 16, at 7-11.
58. Hoffman & Kincaid, AIDS: The Challenge to Life and Health Insurers'
Right to Freedom of Contract,35 DRAxE L. REv. 709, 715-21 (1986) (hereinafter
Hoffman, Freedom of Contract). See also Clifford, AIDS and Insurance,supra
note 8, at 1806; Note, A ParadigmaticInquiry, supra note 2, at 1059.
59. Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 715-17.
60. Note, A ParadigmaticInquiry,supra note 2, at 1068. See also Clifford,
AIDS and Insurance,supra note 8, at 1807-08; Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,
supra note 58, at 715-21.
61. A twenty to twenty-five year old, healthy male with a moderate income
should live to a normal life expectancy (70 years). Since this applicant is presently healthy, he is not likely to make any large claims under his policy in the
near future. For a description of the factors that determine high and low risk
classifications, see Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 716-17.
62. Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 717.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 739-41.
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applicant's risk category.65 For example, an applicant with circulatory problems typically will have an increased risk of stroke or
heart attackl 66 Thus, an insurance company will place this applicant in a higher risk category based upon the possibility that the
other conditions (stroke and heart attack) may occur due to his preexisting circulatory problem.67 Also, the insurance company will
not honor any claims based on his circulatory disorder. 68
The insurance industry's use of pre-existing health conditions
to classify applicants depends on the insurance company's ability to
classify the condition. 69 HIV/AIDS attacks the entire immune system, not just one bodily organ or part.70 It is this pervasive aspect
of the virus that renders the pre-existing health condition standard
inadequate and unsuitable as a means to classify HIV/AIDS applicants.71 Whereas chest pains and numbness in the-left arm indicate
a possible heart attack,72 a bout with pneumonia or a persistent fever may or may not indicate HIV/AIDS. 73 Most HIV/AIDS patients .do not even become aware of the seriousness of their
condition until a series of symptoms occur.74 In addition, persons
exposed to HIV can be asymptomatic 75 for lengthy periods of time.
65. See Note, A ParadigmaticInquiry, supra note 2, at 1068-73. See also

Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 735-41.
66. Patients with circulatory disorders have an increased risk of heart disease and stroke. THE MERCK MANUAL, supra note 17, at 643-51.
67. See Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 715-17 (change in
factors for classification alter risk category).
68. Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 739-41.
69. Note, A ParadigmaticInquiry, supra note 2, at 1068-73.
70. See Centers for Disease Control, Update on Acquired Immune Deficzency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States, 31 MoRBI iY. AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 507-14 (1982) (case definition for AIDS and description of combination of symptoms);-Merritt, Communicable Diseaseand ConstitutionalLaw:

ControllingAIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739, 743-45 (1986); PRESiDNTIAL CoMiISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 7-11. See generally Claskfition of HTLV-

III/LAV-Related Diseases, 125 J. OF INFECTIOUS DISEAsLS 1095 (1985); Centers
for Disease Control, Classiicationfor Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
I1ILymphadenopathy-Assoczated Virus Infections, 35 MoRBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 334-39 (1986).
71. Centers for Disease Control, Update on Acquired Immune Deficency
Syndrome (AIDS) - United States, 31 MoRBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP.

507-14 (1982).
72. See THE MERcK MANUAL, supra note 17, at 350-55.
73. Pneumnoma or fevers must be chromc (present for three or more
months and unexplained) before they indicate HIV/AIDS exposure. Classfia-

tion of HTLV-Hh/LAV Related Tissues, 125 J. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASEs 1095
(1985).
74. See Centers for Disease Control, Update on Acquired Immune Deficency Syndrome (AIDS) - United States, 31 MORBITrrY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 507-14 (1982). See also PRESIDENTIAL COMMIssION REPORT, supra

note 16, at 7-11; Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 861-64.
75. An asymptomatic patient is a patient who does not presently demonstrate any signs of illness.

.
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The Pre-EzistingHealth Condtion Standard and the "Origzn"
of AIDS

The insurance industry bases the pre-existing health condition
standard on the usual situation in which every major condition has
76
a distinct origin and readily identifiable manner of manifestation.
AIDS does have a distinct origin.77 It originates from the transmission of HIV. 7s However, doctors and scientists cannot readily detect
HIV transmission.7 9 Only a blood test, performed after a sufficient
waiting or "window" period, can detect the presence of HIV in a
person's body. 0 After a positive HIV test, doctors consider this person "seropositive" since the antibodies in his blood serum have converted to HIV antibodies. However, the presence of HIV does not
mean that the symptoms of full-blown AIDS will manifest themselves shortly.8 ' In fact, years may pass before a person becomes
aware, due to detectable symptoms, that the person has been exposed to this deadly virus.8 2
Prior to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the courts defined the origin
or manifestation of a pre-existing health condition in one of three
ways. A pre-existing health condition originated or manifested itself: (1) at the time of its medical inception; (2) when the condition
impaired the normal function of the body; or (3) when a person had
actual knowledge of the condition's presenceSS All three of these
definitions present problems for HIV/AIDS applicants because of
clauses in their insurance contracts identifying the origin of a condi76. Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 995-97. See also Hoffman,
Freedom of Contract, supra note 58, at 715-20.
77. All research indicates that persons infected with AIDS have been exposed to HIV Centers for Disease Control, ClassificationSystem forHuman 2Lymphotropw Virus Type IIILymphadenopathy-Assoczated Virus Infections,
35 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 334-35 (1986); PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 1, 7-11. However, not all HIV positive persons develop AIDS. See Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 860-61.
78. See supra note 27 for articles on HIV transmission.
79. For a discussion of the "window" period of HIV infection, see supra
notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of the two tests used to detect the presence of HI1V in
the human body, see supra note 25.
81. See Centers for Disease Control, Classification System for Human
Lymphotropw Virus Type Il/Lymphadenopathy-Assoczated Virus Infections,
35 MoRBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 334-39 (1986) (overview of diagnosis of AIDS symptoms). See also PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 16, at 7-20 (1988); CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 131.
82. CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 131.
83. See Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 998-1000. See also Nat'l
Casualty Co. v. Hudson, 32 Ala. App. 69, 70-71, 21 So. 2d 568, 569-70 (1945) (condition did not hinder insured's use of knee until after benefits of policy accrued); Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc. v. Klapper, 153 Ind. App. 555, 558-59, 288 N.E.2d
279, 281-82 (1972) (manifestation occurs when doctor can diagnose condition);
MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW §§ 17:1-9 (1972).
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tion, which can be used against them.84
The first definition, the medical inception doctrine, is particularly problematic for HIV/AIDS applicants. The medical inception
of AIDS is the moment of exposure to HIV, and is only detectable
through a specific series of blood tests taken after several weeks to
several months.s5 However, in the past these blood tests have produced false results. s 6 These false results involve one of two possible
outcomes: a false negative or a false positive. One way m which a
false negative occurs is when the blood test is unable to detect a
measurable amount of HIV antibodies in the applicant's blood.8 7
Even though HIV begins to produce antibodies shortly after exposure, the antibodies are not readily detectable in small amounts.88
Although medical science has made advances in both of the blood
tests used to detect HIV/AIDS, their level of sensitivity to HIV antibodies is still not refined enough to immediately spot traces of
HIV exposure. s 9
Additionally, these tests may produce false positive results due
to improper storage of the serum or mixed specimens. 9 0 The presence of other antibodies in the blood may be misread and mistaken
for HIV antibodies. 91 Furthermore, human error or a technician's
failure to confirm the results may also produce a false positive. 92
Thus, an applicant would test "positive" for exposure to HIV when
he/she could be '"IV
free".93 Absolute and conclusive detection of
HIV exposure is impossible due to the instability of HIV test results. Yet the insurance industry continues to rely on the HIV tests
in determining the presence of a pre-existing HIV/AIDS -health
condition.94 The undetectable nature of the precise time of expo84. See Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 739-40.
85. For a discussion of the blood tests used. to detect HIV antibodies, see
supra note 25.
86. See Centers for Disease Control, Update. Serologw TestingforAntibody
to Human Immunodejicency Virus, 36 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY

REP. 833-84 (1988). See also Closen, Testing Democracy,supra note 2, at 871-75;
CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 149; Note, A ParadigmaticInquiry, supra note 2, at
1060-62.
87. See Closen, Testing Democracy, supranote 2, at 871-75.
88. See supra note 25 for a discussion of the tests used to detect the presence of HIV antibodies m the human immune system. See also Closen, Testing
Democracy, supra note 2, at 871-75.
89. Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 873.
90. See CLOSEN, supra note 1, at 149.
91. See Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 873. But see Saag &
Britz, supra note 25, at 118.
92. I&
93. See Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 873. See also Note, A
ParadigmaticInquiry, supra note 2, at 1060-62.
94. See Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 715-21. See also
Schatz, Underwriting,supra note 2, at 1782; Note, A ParadigmaticInquvry,
supra note 2, at 1059.

The John Marshall Law Remew

[Vol. 24:653

sure to HIV does not conform to the medical inception definition of
"origin"; this definition, therefore, is mapplicable to an HIV/AIDS
setting.
The second definition, the impairment doctrine, looks at the
impairment of an applicant's normal bodily functions prior to his
insurance application. 95 The key element in this definition is the
concept of impairment. 96 An impairment occurs when an illness or
injury causes the disfunction of a bodily part, thereby weakening or
diminishing that part's functionng. 97 This weakness is permanent
but will not spread to other parts of the body. Perhaps the most
common example of an impairment is a slipped disc in the back.
The disc, once injured, can never be completely restored, even
through medical treatment. Therefore, an applicant with this condition will probably experience medical problems at some point
later in life. An insurance company will either preclude coverage
for any further treatment of the applicant's back, or will only allow
limited coverage of "new" injuries/illnesses to this same area.98
The ability to isolate a particular impairment is paramount in
the insurance industry's use of the impairment doctrine.99 Just as
absolute detection of HIV in the early stages of AIDS is impossible,
complete isolation of the impairments that follow HIV exposure is
equally impossible until the applicant develops significant symptoms/impairments; this could take years.ie° HIV attacks the entire
human immune system, not just one organ or body part.' 0 '
HIV/AIDS is similar to other systemic illnesses like multiple sclerosis and muscular dystrophy, in that the virus attacks the human
body as a whole.' 0 2 It is impossible for medical science to predict
95. Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 999. See also Nat'l Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Hudson, 32 Ala. App. 69, 71-72,21 So.2d 568,570 (1945) (court equates
manifestation of disease with hindrance of organ or limb).
96. Annotation, Construction,supra note 3, at 999.
97. See MEYER, LIFE ANT) HEALTH INsURANcE LAw § 17:6 (1972). Some jurisdictions hold that the abnormal functioning of the body can constitute manfestation if the applicant was aware of serious symptoms prior to the effective
date of the policy, even if he was not aware of having a disease. See Malone v.
Continental Life and Accident Co., 89 Idaho 77, 403 P.2d 225 (1965) (applicant
treated by doctor for cancer but never told cause of treatment); Dowdall v.
Commercial Traveler's Mut. Accident Ass'n, 344 Mass. 71,181 N.E.2d 594 (1962)
(doctor knew applicant had multiple sclerosis but neglected to inform applicant
until years after effective date of policy). But see Rosenberg v. North Dakota
Hosp. Serv. Ass'n, 136 N.W.2d 128 (N.D. 1965) (actual diagnosis necessary to
impute knowledge of condition to applicant).
98. See Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 739-41; Annotation,
Construction,supra note 3, at 1035-36.
99. See Hoffman, Freedom of Contract; supra note 58, at 73541. See also
Schatz, Undemoriting,supra note 2, at 1782.
100. See infra note 105 for a list of AIDS symptoms.
101. See PRESIDENIAL COiUssION REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
102. See supra note 77 for articles on the diagnosis of AIDS. See also Closen,
Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 856-58.

1991]

AIDS and the Pre-Existing Health Condition Standard

669

with certainty which area of the HIV/AIDS patient's body will initially be most afflicted. The only known factor is that all of his
body will eventually be affected by the illness.103
HIV/AIDS cannot be categorized into a series of insurable impairments.1 4 Certain symptoms are known to develop during the
first stage of AIDS. 05 However, the course and severity of the remaming symptoms are unpredictable. No AIDS patient will follow
quite the same course as a previous patient.'0° Unlike the applicant
with a slipped disc, the HIV/AIDS applicant cannot be certain his
"impairment" will remain constant for very long. In fact, the only
thing he can be sure of is that his impairment will not remain localized in one body organ/part. Therefore, the definition of impairment used by the insurance industry to determine the presence of a
pre-existing health condition is inadequate when dealing with the
unique nature of HIV/AIDS.
Finally, the third definition the insurance industry uses centers
on an applicant's knowledge of his condition prior to Ins application
for insurance. 10 7 This "knowledge" definition is equally troublesome because a person actually knows he or she has been exposed
to HIV/AIDS only if the person undergoes an HIV test which allows for a sufficient "window" period, 0 8 or knows of the classic
symptoms of HIV/AIDS.10 9 As previously mentioned, the blood
tests used to detect the presence of HIV are not completely relia103. CLOSEN, supr note 1, at 856-61.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of various
AIDS symptoms. Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has released a
list of symptoms used for diagnosing AIDS. This list includes the simultaneous
presence of: (1) malignant tumors (Kaposi's sarcoma); (2) protozoa infections
(pneumocystis pneumonia); (3) fungus infections (candidiases); (4) viral infections (hepatitis). Centers for Disease Control, Rem== of the Case Definition
of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome for National Reporting - United
States, 34 MoRBmrrY AND MORTALiTY WEEKLY REP. 373, 373-75 (1985). See also

Classification of HTLV-II/L.AV Related Diseases, 152 J. OF INFECTIOUS DIsEASES 1095 (1985); Centers for Disease Control, AIDS and The Human Immunodeflency Virus Infection In The United States: 1988 Update, 38 MORBiITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP 1-2 (1989); Closen, Testing Democracy, supra
note 2, at 862-64.
106. Although AIDS can be detected by a series of symptoms, the severity or
course of these symptoms vary with each patient. See Centers for Disease Control, Update on Acquired Immune Deficnency Syndrome (AIDS) - United
States, 38 MoRBIDrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 507 (1982).
107. Annotation, Construction, supra note 3, at 999-1000. See also Mutual
Hosp. Ins., Inc. v. Klapper, 153 Ind. App. 555, 288 N.E.2d 279 (1972) (disease
exists when it is known to insured or is capable of being diagnosed bydoctor).
108. Due to the "window" period, HIV antibodies cannot be detected mmediately following exposure. See Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at
871-75.
109. See also supra notes 34-36, and 105 for a discussion of HIV/AIDS
symptoms.
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ble.U ° In addition, unless an applicant has a reason to believe he
was exposed to HIV, he would not generally undergo such a test.
Therefore, m most cases only the onset of AIDS symptoms would
cause him to suspect his condition.
Many symptoms of AIDS are, m fact, illnesses. 11 In addition,
the initial symptoms (weight loss, fevers, and fatigue) are possibly
indicative of many other, less severe, illnesses. 1' 2 An applicant who
develops one of these generalized symptoms prior to his application
for insurance may not realize that such symptoms are an indication
of exposure to HIV/AIDS. However, the insurance industry has
been successful in using this pre-diagnosed medical ailment to preclude coverage when that ailment is later revealed to be an underlying symptom of AIDS.n 3 Therefore, actual knowledge of the
severity of one's condition is not necessary to prevent the insurance
industry from using the pre-existing health condition standard
against the unsuspecting applicant." 4
To date, no applicants have successfully challenged this knowledge requirement in the HIV/AIDS context." 5 However, in cases
involving different types of serious conditions, courts required the
insurers to prove the applicant's actual knowledge of his condition
and his intent to deceive the msurance company before the company may preclude insurance coverage. n 6 Presently, neither of
110. Closen, Testing Democracy,supra note 2, at 871-72. See also supra notes
86-93 and accompanying text.
111. See Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonua-LosAngeles,
30 MORBIDIT

AND MORTALXTY WEEKLY REP. 250-52 (1981); Centers for Disease

Control, Kaposi'sSarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonza Among Homosexual

Men-New York City and California, 30 MoRBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 305-08 (1981).
112. A persistent fever is an indication of several illnesses (other than
AIDS). Among these illnesses are: (1) drug hypersensitivity, (2) malaria; (3)

measles; (4) rubella; (5) flu/influenza; and (6) the common cold. THE MERCK
MANUAL, supra note 17, at 323-27, 171, 182-83, 189, 191, 239. Additionally, there
are several dozen different types of pneumonma that are less deadly than

pneumocystis carmnii which have similar symptoms. I& at 651-66
113. Lilley I, supra note 5, at 3-5 (applicant never diagnosed with AIDS prior
to death, but, nonetheless, applicant's claim was barred due to his HIV/AIDS

infection).
114. Some jurisdictions hold that the manifestation of the symptoms of a disease without actual diagnosis is enough to establish the presence of a pre-existing condition. See Cardamone v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 Il. App. 3d 435, 439-40,
364 N.E.2d 460, 462-64 (1977) (insured's visit to doctor for stomach pains prior to
effective date of policy sufficient to establish knowledge of gall bladder
problem).
115. See supra notes 5 and 48. The plaintiff in Lilley I, supra note 5, at 20,
successfully challenged this knowledge requirement at the trial court level, but
the decision was overturned on appeal. Lilley II, supranote 4, at 8-9.
116. See generally Massachusetts Casualty Ins. Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425,
428 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denzed 424 U.S. 914 (1976); Nat'l Life and Accident Ins.
Co. v. Mixon, 50 Ala. App. 697, 699-701, 282 So. 2d 306, 308 (1972); Chavis v.
United Family Life Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 179, 180, 236 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1977).
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these two elements are necessary m the AIDS context for an insurance company to preclude coverage?-' 7 Unlike its two counterpart

definitions that are ill-equipped to deal with the pervasiveness of
HIV/AIDS, the insurance industry and the courts are simply ignoring the "knowledge" definition and its elements. Insurers are indiscriminately using this definition to label any general ailment a preexisting condition of HIV/AIDS.
The three definitions of the origin of a pre-existing health condition are unsuited for use m an AIDS setting. These definitions do
not consider that the symptoms of HIV/AIDS may not even mdicate HIV exposure." 8 The symptoms are general and can indicate

many other ailments.119 Nor do these definitions account for the
difficulty in accurately detecting exposure to HIV.' 20 Moreover,
these definitions ignore judicial guidelines regarding the extent of
an applicant's knowledge of a pre-existing condition prior to application.121 Thus, an insurance company can hold an applicant accountable for knowledge of his HIV/AIDS condition prior to the
time when a medical determination of that condition is possible and
prior to the applicant having actual or implied knowledge of his
condition.
These three definitions of the origin of a pre-existing health
condition leave an HIV/AIDS applicant unprotected. The
HIV/AIDS virus defies medical conventions and definitions. The
definitions and standards must be adapted to meet the AIDS crisis.
Until these definitions address the unique conditions and symptoms
of AIDS, the pre-existing health condition standard will remain deficient as an insurance practice during the AIDS crisis. 22
117. See Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 736-38.
118. See supranote 105 for the combination of symptoms needed to diagnose
AIDS.
119. See supra note 112 for a discussion of other ailments which mumic AIDS
symptoms.e
120. For a discussion of the reliability of HIV testing, see supra note 25. See
also Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 871-75.
121. For a comparison of cases dealing with an applicant's knowledge m a
wilful misrepresentation suit, see supra note 10.
122.
Although difficult and inadequate, insurance companies are using the
definition of a pre-existing health condition to "justify withholding life or
health benefits to policyholders who exhibited any ailments prior to being diagnosed with AIDS." Schatz, Underwriting,supranote 2, at 1786. See also AIDS
Victim Used Other'sBlood to Get Policy,InsurersSay, COURIER PosT p.6B (Jul.
8, 1990) (insured pays $30,365 per year to maintain a $2 million insurance policy). This preclusion of benefits has opened the door to a series of collateral
issues that must be addressed before the lack of coverage rises to crisis proportions. Among the issues to be addressed are: (1) the discrimination against single persons employed in "gay" professions; (2) the responsibilities of insurance
companies that require the HIV test; and (3) coverage for the rejected appliI
cants.
The first issue to be addressed is the discrimination by insurance companies
of single men or persons employed in certain "gay" jobs. Schatz, Underwriting,
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IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: COST SPREADING OF KNOWN RISKS
THROUGH RISK CLASSIFICATION
The insurance industry's use of the pre-existing health condition standard does not cope with the HIV/AIDS crisis because it
supra note 2, at 1186-88. Included among these so-called "gay" jobs are hairdressers, flight attendants, interior designers, and florists. Id See also THE
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsESSMENT SURVEY, AIDS and Health
Insurance 32, 37 (Feb. 1988). Some insurance companies automatically deny
coverage to single men employed in these industries. Bahls, False Security:
Who Gets Access to AIDS Test Results?, STUDENT LAwYER, Feb. 1990, at 44
[hereinafter Bahls, FalseSecurity]. Other companies require an HIV test as a
prerequisite to insurance for these "gay" jobholders. Id. See also CLOSEN,
supra note 1, at 555-60. Since the courts have upheld the use of HIV testing in
the insurance industry, discriminatory testing based on a person's chosen profession appears legal. See Am. Council of Life Ins. v. District of Columbia, 645
F Supp. 84, 86-88 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Life Ins. Ass'n v. Comm'r of Ins., 403 Mass.
410, 416-17, 530 N.E.2d 168, 172 (1988). State legislatures, however, have recognized the need to prevent the insurance industrys use of arbitrary questions
regarding sexual orientation, gender of roommates, and lifestyle on insurance
applications. Schatz, Underwriting,supra note 2, at 1789. Many states have enacted non-discrimnation statutes to prevent insurance companies from using
biased questions on their applications. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 799 (West
Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.429.5 (West Supp. 1991). However, less overt
methods of discrimination, such as the total exclusion of single men in certain
"gay" cities, continues without legislative intervention. See Bahls, False Security, supra, at 44; Schatz, Underwriting,supra note 2, at 1782-85.
Second, the insurance industry's use of HIV testing to determine when a
pre-existing condition exists is an additional area of concern. Most testing statutes do contain clauses relating the insurance company's responsibility before
and after testing. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.429 (West Supp. 1991) N.Y. INS.
LAw § 2611 (McKinney 1989). The insurance company must make sure the applicant is aware of the test procedure and the implication of its results. However, these statutes do not address the realities of having to undergo the test
itself nor the effects of a positive test result. They do not provide for a centralized counseling center where the HIV positive applicant can confront the psychological impact of the HIV test. Moreover, once the insurance company
obtains the test results it is virtually relieved of its legal responsibility to the
tested applicant. See Bahls, False Security, supra, at 40; Schatz, Underwriting,
supranote 2, at 1782-87; Note, A ParadigmaticInquiry,supra note 2, at 1060-67.
Furthermore, few of these testing statutes address the question of confidentiality of the test results. Bahls, False Security,supra, at 40. CompareRasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(court refused to grant transfusion patient access to name of HIV infected donor) with Jones v. American Nat'l Red Cross, No. 84-4510 (LExM, State library,
Omm file) (plaintiff allowed to discover identity of donor). As yet, the question
of whether an insurance company can share the test results, on a limited basis,
with other insurance companies has not been litigated. It is also undetermined
whether they can release these results to other interested parties (employers,
doctors, etc.) who wish to be informed about their perspective employee or patient.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, while the pre-existing health condition standard may aid the insurance industry in decreasing its rinsk, it does nothing to aid the large number of rejected applicants. See Note, A Paradigmatic
Inquzry, supra note 2, at 1062-67. These applicants find themselves unable to
obtain affordable coverage that includes adequate benefits necessary when or if
these individuals become ill. Someone will ultimately have to bear the burden
of supporting these currently uninsured individuals. Schatz, Underwriting,
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results m total preclusion of applicants. Without insurance coverage, these applicants will turn to the welfare system or some other
publicly funded alternative for their health care. From a purely
economic standpoint, insurance compames insist they must apply
some restrictions when issuing policies. However, precluding seropositive individuals from insurance coverage is not a justifiable restriction, especially when the applicant has not yet exhibited any
AIDS symptoms, nor has knowledge of this condition. Critics of the
present insurance system advance a re-structuring of the insurance
industry's practice of cost spreading through risk classifications as a
possible solution to this growing irend of total preclusion.'m
To a limited extent, the insurance industry already uses cost
spreading of known risks through risk classification. 124 An insurance company determines the expected-needs of each applicant and
places that applicant with others who have similar needs, so that
each applicant may be charged accordingly. 125 The classification of
applicants is based on the statistics available on like individuals.126
Statistics reveal that AIDS is no more likely a cause of premature
death than cancer, 12 , and that the direct medical costs during the
last year of life for each group are remarkably similar. 12 8 Additionally, direct medical costs for each group can be reduced by the use
of less costly facilities, such as home health care and out-patient
Yet the insurance industry denies coverage to serotreatment.'
positive individuals, while the same industry continues to bear the
supra note 2, at 1799-1803. It is already obvious from the number of AIDS patients who die bankrupt, that the families and employers of these patients cannot bear this burden. Thus, the only other viable alternative for society is the
welfare system. CLOsEN, supra note 1, at 565-71. See also Weaver v. Reagen,
701 F Supp. 717 (W.D. Mo. 1988), cf'd, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989). The government is a perennial deep pocket. It can always trim one budget to better
fund another. Individual families and employers do not have this luxury. Unfortunately, society still seems to view HIV/AIDS as a "gay disease" and is reluctant to advocate a welfare support system for rejected HIV/AIDS applicants.
See Closen, Testing Democracy, supra note 2, at 837-40. Thus, an employer will
support an HIV/AIDS individual as long as his group insurance benefits last,
then the HIV/AIDS individual's family will be left to bear the burden. Once
their resources are depleted, the HIV/AIDS individual might qualify for Medicare, but will most likely die bankrupt. See Bahls, False Seczirity, supra, at 40,
44.
123. See Note, A ParadigmaticInquvry, supra note 2, at 1068-76. See also
Hoffman, Freedon of Contract,supra note 58; Schatz, Underwriting,supra
note 2.
124. Note, A ParadigmaticInquiry, supranote 2, at 1068-76.
125. Id. at 1067-68 (explanation of risk classification).
126. Id. at 1069-70 (use of statistics to. separate applicants into risk
categories).
127. Id. at 1069 (comparison of terminally ill cancer patients to AIDS
patients).
128. Note, A ParadigmaticInquzry, supra note 2, at 1068-70 (medical expenditures of patients with cancer similar to AIDS patients m last year of life).
129. Schatz, Underwriting,supra note 2, at 1796.
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cost of care for cancer patients. This disparity is due, in part, to the
insurance industry's use of HIV testing as its primary classification
13 0

tool.

Proper cost spreading is only possible if risk classifications accurately reflect the differences among applicants and their expected losses.131 Total exclusion of seropositive individuals does not
meet this requirement for proper cost spreading because this exclusion prevents a comparison of HIV/AIDS individuals with other
high risk applicants.' 32 Studies reveal similarities in direct medical
costs between cancer patients and HIV/AIDS patients.'33 However,
at present, the insurance industry does not examine these other factors prior to excluding HIV positive applicants. A comparison of
the current risks of a seropositive applicant to those of other high
risk applicants is necessary to achieve proper risk classification of
HIV positive applicants.
To prevent the preclusion of seropositive applicants, health insurance companies should re-structure their approach and follow
the risk structure used by automobile msurers.'3 The automobile
insurance industry uses a system whereby each driver is grouped
according to his age, experience, and past driving record.135 Drivers
with a history of accidents are usually classified as high risks and
subjected to high premiums. 36 Conversely, drivers with an accident-free driving record are classified as low risk applicants and
charged low premiums.L37 A symptomless seropositive applicant is
similar to the sixteen year old driver with an accident-free history.
This applicant is not, as yet, a risk to the insurance company and his
ultimate cost to the insurance company is unknown.
Additionally, a symptomless seropositive applicant is similar to
an accident-free driver because both the driver and the applicant
will require coverage benefits at a later, undetermined time. Taking this into account, the insurance company can charge the accident-free driver and the seropositive applicant a higher premum
than presently needed. The driver and applicant would be subsidizing others in the program who currently need extra benefits.
38
Later, the premiums of other applicants will subsidize them.
130. See Hoffman, Freedom of Contract,supra note 58, at 721-23. See also
Schatz, Underwriting,supra note 2, at 1782; Closen, Testing Democracy, supra
note 2, at 837; Note, A ParadigmaticInquvry, supra note 2, at 1068.
131. Note, A ParadigmaticInquiry, supra note 2, at 1068.
132. Id. at 1069-70.
133. I&
134. See Note, DiscrtminationOn The Basts of HIV Infection: An Economw
Analysis, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 965, 986-93 (1989).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Clifford, AIDS and Insurance,supra note 8, at 1817-19.
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This system would be sunilar to the present social security system
where a citizen invests now for the benefit of others on the theory
that these same benefits will be available to him later.
The above illustration is typical of the operating procedure of
most insurance companies. Ordinarily, one group, usually the low
risk category, subsidizes the other groups.1s9 The high risk group,
although subjected to high premiums, pays smaller premiums relative to the benefits received.140 Presumably however, these high
risk persons were once in the lower risk category, paying higher
premiums then necessary to support others in high risk categories.
A system whereby HIV positive applicants pay higher premiums
now for coverage later is in keeping with this established system.' 41
However, until the insurance industry is willing to use HIV testing
as a method to classify rather than preclude HIV positive applicants, the present system will continue to inadequately address the
m
2
Consequently, society will have to bear the health
AIDS criss.'
care costs HIV/AIDS individuals desperately need.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The AIDS crisis arose at a time when society began to question
many of the practices of the insurance industry. One of these practices, the exclusion of coverage on the basis of the pre-existing
health condition standard, regularly precludes applicants with
HIV/AIDS from coverage. As the number of rejected applicants
rises, the inapplicability of this standard to individuals with
HJJV/AJDS becomes evident.
Prior to the beginning of the AIDS epidemic, the insurance industry used three possible definitions for the origin of a disease, to
preclude coverage for pre-existing health conditions. However,
none of these definitions are suited for use in an AIDS setting.
These definitions do not account for the unreliability of current
HIV/AIDS testing or the inability of medical science to isolate the
virus. Furthermore, these definitions do not acknowledge the diffi139. Id. at 1817.
140. Id.
141. Supporters of HIV testing as a preclusionary device argue that the cov-

erage paid m the early stages of HIV exposure are not adequate to offset the

losses incurred by the insurance industry when the applicant develops AIDS.
See Clifford, AIDS and Insurance,supranote 8, at 1817-19. However, it should
be pointed out that the same is true for applicants who develop terminal illnesses other than AIDS. Yet the insurance mdustry is willing to carry these
applicants even though they too do not properly counterbalance the losses recurred by the industry. Schatz, Underwriting,supra note 2, at 106970.
142. Even the supporters of HIV testing acknowledge that the present msurance system is inadequate. Clifford, AIDS and Insurance,supra note 8, at 181719. However, they argue that the inadequacies must be allowed to preserve the
prmmples on which the insurance business was founded. Id. at 1807, 1817-19.
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culty an AIDS applicant faces m recognizing the generalized symptoms of the early stages of the virus. The combination of these
factors make proper classification of the risks of HIV/AIDS difficult. This classification would be possible however, if the insurance
industry compares the risks of HIV positive applicants with those of
other high risk applicants. Thus, a re-structuring of the present
classification practices used by the insurance industry is necessary.
Absent such a change, the insurance industry will continue to use
the pre-existing health condition standard to discriminate against
HIV/AIDS applicants by precluding their insurance benefits.
BarbaraLynn Pedersen

